Rayn Lakha
The government of the United Kingdom holds that it strives for a world where it can disarm itself of its nuclear arsenal, but is unfortunately forced by current geopolitical conditions to maintain such brutal instruments of destruction to deter coercion and attack and ensure Britain’s safety. Does the UK’s security environment actually necessitate the possession of an independent deterrent though, and is it possible for the UK to immediately disarm itself without significantly diminishing its security?
Some propose that the large budget currently reserved for our nuclear arsenal (replacing the ageing Vanguard-class submarines which host the missiles is expected to cost up to £41 billion - almost as much as the UK’s entire defence budget in 2022/23, and estimated maintenance costs over the new submarines’ 30 year lifetime sum to about £130 billion) could be redirected towards conventional forces, so that there is no net negative change in our military deterrent strength. It is argued that since all nuclear powers are immensely unwilling to use their nuclear capabilities, and would endeavour to constrain any war to a conventional conflict, conventional capabilities are actually more important than nuclear ones in helping the UK to win a war, and so are a more potent deterrent. Hence, redirecting the nuclear budget to expanding Britain’s conventional offensive power could actually ensure our security more effectively.
The assumption that potential enemies would strive to refrain from deploying nuclear weapons in battle may have been accurate in the 20th century3. However, in a world with greater nuclear enfranchisement, where extremist regimes such as North Korea and Iran already or soon will possess the bomb, and even Russia has hinted at its willingness to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine, the UK cannot be certain that antagonists would stick to conventional warfare. Instead, the concept of mutually assured destruction is more important than ever to ward off nuclear attacks.
However, even if a nuclear deterrent is essential, the UK has very close defence ties with two nuclear powers: the US and France, so it could simply rely on their nuclear umbrellas to deter aggression. The major issue with this arrangement - that partners could withdraw their protection, leaving Britain vulnerable to antagonists - could potentially be solved by what Professor Vipin Narang at MIT termed ‘insurance hedging’. This involves the unconcealed maintenance of partially developed nuclear warhead technology, and serves two main purposes. Firstly, it would decrease the time required to redevelop and build an independent nuclear deterrent should allied protection be withdrawn, so Britain would not be left without a nuclear shield for long. Secondly, since both possible protectors - the US and France - are staunch opponents of nuclear proliferation and desire as much control over nuclear escalation within their bloc as possible, the implicit threat of the UK regaining nuclear weapons if it is not certain of allied nuclear protection could pressure the US and France into maintaining the provision of extended deterrence.
Japan’s nuclear relationship with the US is a useful example of the success of this policy; its usage of insurance hedging “lends credibility to [its] threat to build nuclear weapons if American extended deterrence is insufficient”5 according to Prof. Narang, inspiring regular American reassurances. For example, in response to Prime Minister SatÅ’s suggestion in 1965 that Japan may have to become a nuclear power due to Chinese pursuit of the H-bomb, President Johnson provided “unequivocal confirmation” of the credibility of the US nuclear deterrent5. A similar implication from Japanese Foreign Minister Aso following North Korea’s 2006 nuclear test spurred the US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to affirm the United States’ determination to meet the “full range of its deterrence … commitments”. Moreover, insurance hedging renders Japan a de facto nuclear weapon state, and thus serves as a “latent deterrent” in itself, according to Japanese defence minister Satoshi Morimoto5; the same principle would apply to the UK.
Ultimately, though, as the British Chiefs of Staff subcommittee on air defence succinctly noted, a nation’s deterrent “does not provide a global defence, it can only defend those places that are completely integrated politically. When New York is vulnerable to attack the United States will not use her strategic weapon in defence of London”4. Our allies’ foremost duty is to protect their own citizens, and prevent nuclear attack against themselves, so now that with the advent of long-range missiles both France and the US are vulnerable to nuclear attack from their opponents, they would almost certainly be unwilling to launch a nuclear strike on behalf of the UK which could invite retaliation against themselves. Hostile actors, knowing this, may therefore be more willing to use nuclear weapons against the UK, even if the US and France nominally extend a nuclear security guarantee.
Separately, if the US and France were to officially rescind their umbrellas, even the short period of time required for the UK to regain nuclear capabilities due to its insurance hedge could be unacceptably long in the highly unstable security environment that would likely precipitate such a withdrawal, particularly given potential redevelopment difficulties involving Britain’s commitment to non-proliferation under the 1968 nuclear non-proliferation treaty.
Furthermore, surrendering its nuclear weapons could harm the UK’s security by decreasing its influence over the military actions of its allies. In the words of former British Chiefs of Staff: “the voice of any country in the military councils of an alliance … [is] largely governed by its military contribution”4. Just as “after the explosion of the first British A-bomb the respect for the United Kingdom military opinion was increased in both Europe and the United States”4, the loss of the UK’s most powerful, most far-reaching military instrument would seriously damage its standing within NATO, limiting its ability to influence decision-making. Since the UK’s national security is exceedingly dependent on NATO’s actions, this would substantially reduce its ability to control the future of its own defence. More broadly, the UK’s loss of its nuclear status would further weaken the European counterweight to the US in NATO, leading the organisation to be drawn ever further away from protecting Europe - a major concern in light of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine - and towards the American focus on the Indochinese peninsula. American resentment towards the UK for passing on more of its security burden could also accelerate this shift.
On balance, due to the superior impact of nuclear compared to conventional capabilities, and the most fundamental nuclear security interests of a state being unaligned with those of its allies, redirection of funding and reliance on allied extended deterrence would not militate the negative national security impact of the UK dismantling its nuclear weapons. This, in addition to the immensely negative effects of the destruction of the UK’s independent deterrent on Britain’s military relationship with other NATO members, means that giving up its nuclear arsenal would significantly decrease the UK’s security.
1 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-nuclear-deterrence-factsheet/uk-nuclear-deterrence-what-you-need-to-know5 Seeking the bomb, by Professor Vipin Narang
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